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Abstract
Companies do not operate in a vacuum. As companies move towards an
increasingly specialized production function and their reach is becoming truly
global, their aptitude in managing and shaping their inter-organizational net-
work is a determining factor in measuring their health. Current models of com-
pany financial health often lack variables explaining the inter-organizational
network, and as such, assume that (1) all networks are the same and (2)
the performance of partners do not impact companies. This paper aims to
be a first step in the direction of removing these assumptions. Specifically,
the impact is illustrated by examining the effects of customer and supplier
concentrations and partners’ credit risk on credit-default swap (CDS) spreads
while controlling for credit risk and size. We rely upon supply-chain data from
Bloomberg that provides insight into companies’ relationships. The empiri-
cal results show that a well diversified customer network lowers CDS spread,
while having stable partners with low default probabilities increase spreads.
The latter result suggests that successful companies do not focus on build-
ing a stable eco-system around themselves, but instead focus on their own
profit maximization at the cost of the financial health of their suppliers’ and
customers’. At a more general level, the results indicate the importance of
considering the inter-organizational networks, and highlight the value of in-
cluding network variables in credit risk models.
Keywords: CDS, Credit Risk, Networks
1 The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reect the views of the authors’
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1 Introduction
The inter-organizational network surrounding companies provides opportunities and
constrains behavior. By creating an extensive network of customers and suppliers
(collectively called partners), a company is likely to increase shareholder value by
specializing on core products and services. This feature can be traced all the way
back, for workers instead of organizations, to Adam Smith and division of labor. At
an organizational level, similar effects are likely to impact companies’ performance
and financial health. For example, the assembly of electronic products is becoming
an increasingly international process, where components and technology are sourced
from specialist suppliers. This process enables companies to focus on core skills,
where return on investment and shareholder value are likely to be optimized.
A host of academic papers have applied a network perspective to identify and
quantify the impact of inter-organizational networks on various success factors [6].
According to the network perspective, organizations are embedded within networks
of interconnected relationships. Different positions in a network are associated with
a range of outcomes, such as imitation, adaptation, innovation, firm survival, and
performance [4]. For example, companies in a position of brokering between others
have relatively higher returns [2].
Unlike traditional perspectives that treat organizations as independent observa-
tions and focus simply on their attributes, network science incorporates additional
structural information. These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive and can
be combined to conduct a superior analysis by including variables based on network
characteristics alongside attribute-based ones.
1.1 Concentration
The first feature of the inter-organizational network that this article attempts to
tackle is concentration. For a company, concentrations can exist both on the
customer-side and the supplier-side. These two aspects represents two different
types of underlying risks. First, customer-concentration is an immediate threat to
the revenue stream as a single or a select few customers provide the majority of
revenue received. For example, Table 1 highlights the top customers of TripAdvisor.
As Expedia represents more than a quarter of TripAdvisor’s revenue, TripAdvisor is
vulnerable to two scenarios: (1) Expedia is in a position to squeeze its profit margins
and (2) a substantial chunk of revenue would potentially be affected were Expedia
to default, downsize, or restructure.
Second, concentration might also occur among suppliers. In this case, a default
event could threaten business continuity and pose as a source of operational risk,
which ultimately could be detrimental to the financial health of a company. Con-
versely to customer concentration that might imply a squeeze on the focal company’s
profit margins through revenue reduction, supplier concentration could lead to cost
increases.
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Customers % Revenue
Expedia Inc 25.63%
Priceline Group Inc/The 19.83%
Orbitz Worldwide Inc 5.44%
CTRIP.COM International Ltd 4.79%
Google Inc 1.53%
American Airlines Group Inc 1.42%
Table 1: Customers with a quantified relationship representing more than 1% of
TripAdvisor Inc’s annual revenue
1.2 Influence: Partners’ default probability
A key feature of networks is the relatively high number of ties among similar nodes
[9]. This feature is often referred to as homophily. Two causal mechanisms lead to
homophily: selection and influence [1]. First, similar nodes tend to form ties together
(i.e., selection). Second, dissimilar nodes tend to become more similar over time if
they are tied (i.e., influence). The latter feature is of key interest when understanding
the consequences of the network as opposed to the mechanisms underpinning the
network. An understanding of influence forms the basis for assessing and quantifying
contagion, diffusion, and cascades.
From an inter-organizational network perspective, the financial health of com-
panies’ partners could provide additional insight into their own financial health.
Specifically, influence can be thought of as directly improving or worsening a com-
pany’s health (e.g., investment grade companies are more stable and thereby bring
about less volatility to their partners). The lowering in volatility is likely to bring
about a smaller risk premium, and as such, enable a smoother operation of the over-
all system. Conversely, the system might not be driven by global optimization, but
by local optimization instead. Companies are likely to prioritize their own profit
maximization (i.e., local optimization) at the expense of ensuring a stable overall
ecosystem (i.e., global optimization). Given the opposing theoretical aspects, it is
an empirical question of whether, and the extent to which, interacting with stable
partners is positively or negatively related to financial health of companies.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First the methodology,
including data collection and metric construction, is presented. This is followed by
results. Finally, a conclusion and discussion section ends the paper with notes on
general applicability, limitations, and avenues of future work.
2 Methodology
To model the effect of customer and supplier concentrations and partners’ credit
risk on the financial health of companies, we apply a regression framework with
credit-default swap (CDS) spreads as the dependent variable while controlling for
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credit risk and market cap. Our observations are all companies with 5-year CDS
spreads on Bloomberg on April 29, 2014. This includes 828 companies. We limit
our observations by excluding banks as they lack a hard asset/manufacturing-type
of supply chain2. This implies removing 152 financial companies from the sample.
As such, the total number of observations is 676. Additionally, we weight the ob-
servations by the reciprocal of companies’ logged market cap in billions to account
for the fact that larger companies are more likely to be included in the sample than
smaller companies. This alleviates potential correlation between the dependant vari-
able and inclusion probability [7] and enables a better understanding of the financial
health of all companies instead of simply the ones that are more likely to have an
observable 5-year CDS spread.
The sub-sections below provide details on the data collection and metric op-
erationalization for quantifying the impact of the inter-organizational networks on
CDS spreads. Note that all variables tend to be skewed and, as shown below for
the dependent variable, transforming the variables by the natural logarithm of them
lessens the skewness. For count variables (e.g., number of suppliers) with a potential
zero score, the log is taken of 1 plus the variable. More details and distribution plots
for all variables are found in the Appendix.
2.1 Dependent variable: CDS spreads
Success or performance of a company can be quantified by a number of metrics.
A traditional risk framework view focuses on the financial health of companies by
predicting default probabilities. These probabilities are often arrived at by modeling
historical default events in a logistic-regression framework or applications of Mer-
ton’s structural default model. However, few companies, and especially large public
companies, default. As such, these frameworks are hard to calibrate and exposed to
rare-event bias.
To overcome potential biases, we choose an outcome variable that is quantified
for a large number of companies and also closely related to the financial health of a
company [8]: CDS spread. Specifically, we use 5-year market CDS spread (in basis
points; bps) as listed on Bloomberg under the Default Risk Monitor (DRAM)-view.
The distribution of the 5-year market CDS spreads is highly right-skewed (Fig-
ure 1a), but conforms closer to a Gaussian shape after transforming it with the
natural logarithm (Figure 1b). This transformation of the dependent variable en-
ables an ordinary least square (OLS) regression framework to be applied, which
lessens the complexity of the model. A well-tested simple model allows us to fo-
cus on incorporating novel metrics to assess the impact of the inter-organizational
network on the financial health of companies.
2Advisory note on the Bloomberg SPLC-screen when analyzing financial institutions
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Figure 1: Distribution of 5-year market CDS spreads
2.2 Inter-organizational network data
The interdependencies among companies are not straight-forward to measure, as-
sess, and collect. In fact, maintaining the confidentiality of this information might
be of strategic importance to the companies. For example, it could enable customers
to circumvent the focal company by purchasing directly from its suppliers. Never-
theless, some companies publish their supply chain (e.g., Apple provides a list of
their top 200 suppliers3) and others’ become known through media coverage and
quarterly reports.
One source that attempts to collect the interdependencies among companies
is Bloomberg. The supply chain analysis (SPLC)-view gives an insight into the
inter-organizational network in which a company operates by listing large suppli-
ers, customers, and peers. The entities in the network are identified by combining
Bloomberg analysts’ assessment, company reports, quarterly filings, company news
releases, and media coverage. To gauge the converage of this data, we performed an
ad-hoc analysis of Apple’s top 200 suppliers-list. There are 695 suppliers listed in
the Bloomberg data, and the intersection among these lists are 191 suppliers, which
indicate a 95.5% coverage rate.
A number of identified relationships are quantified (e.g., Toyota Motors is 3M
biggest customer responsible for 4.4% of their revenue). This information is, how-
ever, only populated for about 37% of the relationships identified4. Moreover, the
quality of these estimates is uncertain due to this information not being required in
regulatory filings.
A key limitation of using this data for network analysis is the difficulty of ex-
tracting it for multiple companies. To overcome this limitation, we created a custom
tools to aid this otherwise manual process.
3See apple.com/supplierresponsibility/
4In total there are 100,030 relationships (63,001 supplier relationships and 37,029 customer
relationships) for the included companies in this study. Out of these, 37,014 relationships are
quantified (23,497 supplier relationships and 13,517 customer relationships).
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2.3 Independent variables: Concentration
We consider three features when assessing concentration of customers and suppli-
ers. First, the numbers of customers and suppliers are key to understand how
concentrated an inter-organizational network is. This is akin to degree within the
network science literature [10]. An increase in these numbers is likely to suggest
additional concentration as only large partners representing concentration are listed
in Bloomberg.
Second, the distribution of relationship values tends to be skewed (e.g., see table
1 for TripAdvisor Inc’s customers). Skewness brings about greater concentration
that simply the number of partners.
Third, concentration can also arise through other companies. For example, both
TripAdvisor and Expedia are suppliers to American Airlines, and since TripAdvisor
and Expedia are mutually connected, American Airlines’ are further concentrated
than what simply the number of suppliers and skewness would suggest.
 
AAL 
TRIP EXPE 
$3.02m $6.88m 
$54.51m 
$1.4m 
Figure 2: Triad among TripAdvisor Inc, Expedia Inc, and American Airlines Group
Inc
To measure the concentrations of customers and suppliers, it is common to ap-
ply the Herfindahl index. For example, the SEC applies it to assess the compet-
itiveness of sectors and creation of monopolies when considering whether or not
to approve mergers. It is defined as the sum of squared proportions. The square
ensures that a single large concentration weights more than many smaller ones.
In our context, we use the percentage of revenue that a relationship represents for
customer-concentration (percentage of total costs for supplier-concentration). In the
example of customer-concentration for TripAdvisor (Table 1), the metric is the sum
of 0.25632, 0.19832, 0.05442, 0.04792, 0.01532, 0.014222, and so on for all customers,
which is about 11%. Formally, it is:
HHI =
∑
j
(
wij
wi++
)2
=
∑
j
pij
2 (1)
where wij is the relationship value from company i to company j, wi++ is the total
revenue (cost) for customer (supplier)-analysis, and pij is the fraction between these
two values.
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It is worth noting that the Herfindahl index does not consider the third feature
listed above: indirect concentrations. To incorporate this feature, constraint, an
advanced version of the Herfindahl index, is often used in network analysis [5]. This
metric comes from the structural holes literature and is formally defined as:
constraint(i) =
∑
j
(
pij +
∑
q
piqpqj
)2
(2)
where q are companies indirectly connected to company i and company j. If there
were no indirect connections, this metric would be equal to the Herfindahl index as
the piqpqj-term would be equal to 0.
However, this metric requires a exponentially larger data collection effort as the
network of all partner companies would need to be acquired. As such, we have
computed five metrics for both customer and supplier lists:
1. Number of companies
2. Number of companies with a Bloomberg identifier, which are likely to be public
companies
3. Number of customers (suppliers) with percentage of revenue (cost) defined
4. The sum of percentage of revenue (cost) that customers (suppliers) represent
5. The Herfindahl Index
It is worth noting that the last two are only calculated on the subset of partners
with a quantified relationship. As such, these metrics only consider about 37% of
the relational data.
2.4 Independent variables: Influence
We consider the default probability of partners to test whether the financial health
of partners impact the focal company. Specifically, we take the average of customers’
(suppliers’) Bloomberg-defined default probability derived from a structural Merton
model. We chose this variable instead of CDS spreads as CDS spreads are only
available for a limited sample of companies, and as such, would lead to sparse data
issues and dropped observations. On the contrary, a default probability is available
for the partners of 70% of relationships5.
For both suppliers and customers, we take a simple average and a weighted
one. The weights are based on the percentage of revenue (costs) that the particular
customer (supplier) represents. While the simple average is applied to about 70%
5Out of the total number of relationships, the partners of 69,637 relationships have a default
probability (45,844 supplier relationships and 23,793 customer relationships).
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of relationships, the weighted is only calculated on 21% (12%) of customer (sup-
plier) relationships as the percentage of revenue (cost) is only available for 37% of
relationships.
2.5 Control variables
To control for general financial information, we include the corporate default prob-
ability as derived by Bloomberg’s structural Merton model [3]. This variable is
correlated with CDS spreads (pair-wise correlation of 0.40; R2 is 0.16 in a univariate
model). In fact, it can be argued that these two variables are the same. However,
the model-derived default probability only considers the independent variables used
in the model, and the purpose of this paper is to highlight that inter-organizational
network variables have the potential of increasing the explanatory power in a com-
bined model.
Additionally, we include the market cap of companies as a proxy of size and
the liquidity of the swaps. Larger companies are likely to provide more information
to the market, be rated by a larger set of investors, and have more contracts with
various maturity dates than smaller ones. As such, their CDS contracts are likely
to be traded more frequently, which increases the liquidity.
We further control for the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector
of the companies. This ensures that sectoral differences are parsed out.
Finally, indicator variables for the country of risk associated with the companies
are included. This variable attempts to overcome spread differences due to countries.
The country of risk is determined based on “four factors listed in order of importance:
management location, country of primary listing, country of revenue and reporting
currency of the issuer. Management location is defined by country of domicile unless
location of such key players as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and/or General Counsel is proven to be
otherwise”.
3 Results
The regression results from a select set of combination of variables are listed in
Table 2. Model 1 is a baseline model without any inter-organizational variables.
We find a strong link between default probability and CDS spreads. Together with
country and sector indicator variables and market cap, this baseline or control model
explains 68% of the variance in CDS spreads. In the Appendix, descriptive statistics
and pair-wise correlation for the main variables are listed in Table 3 and results for
the indicator variables are in Table 4 .
We find a relationship between CDS spreads and the various inter-organizational
variables. Specifically, Model 2 shows that having many large suppliers lowers the
CDS spread while having large customers increase the spread. The latter feature is
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Models
Variables M1 M2 M3
Concentration
Suppliers (log) -0.081** -0.042
(0.027) (0.026)
Customers (log) 0.135*** 0.114***
(0.022) (0.022)
Influence
Suppliers (log) -0.251***
(0.033)
Customers (log) -0.077**
(0.029)
DP (log) 0.315*** 0.363*** 0.396***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Market Cap (log) -0.007 -0.026 -0.020
(0.019) (0.025) (0.023)
GICS sector indicators incl. incl. incl.
Country of Risk indicators incl. incl. incl.
Constant 7.284*** 7.538*** 5.599***
(0.159) (0.201) (0.303)
Observations 676 676 676
R2 0.6806 0.6997 0.7319
Adjusted R2 0.6642 0.6832 0.7163
∆R2 (bps; from M1) 191 513
Table 2: Regression results; Full table available in the Appendix.
∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
maintained in Model 3 when including influence variables. Both influence variables
are negatively related to spread. This indicates that higher default probabilities
of partners are associated with lower spreads of the focal company. This effect
suggests that financially healthy focal companies prioritize profit maximization over
overall stability in their inter-organizational network by, for example, squeezing their
suppliers’ profit margins, which in turn is detrimental to their financial health. For
example, Walmart has the potential exerting pressure on suppliers if it represents a
large proportion of their revenue. As such, it does seem that local optimization is
favored over global optimization.
The inter-organizational variables increase the explanatory power of the frame-
work. By including concentration and influence variables, the R2 increases from 0.68
to 0.73. This 513bps increase suggests that inter-organizational variables provide
novel and additional insight into CDS spreads.
For a more comprehensive set of variable-combinations, see Table 5 in the Ap-
pendix. It is worth noting that some of these combinations bring about greater
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model improvement, but we have chosen the simpler operationalizations of concen-
tration and influence in Table 2. To ensure an identical sample, we set the suppliers’
(customers’) average default probability to the average of observed values when miss-
ing as 61 companies have either no suppliers or no customers with a defined default
probability. An alternative to Model 3 with these observations dropped increases
the R2 to 0.8220. To be conservative, we choose the identical larger sample used
in Models 1 and 2 with lower model improvement for comparability. As a robust-
ness check, the analysis was conducted on the complete set of observation (i.e.,
including financial institutions) and the model improvement was maintained albeit
with smaller R2 values (m1: 0.6231; m2: 0.6300; m3: 0.6585; ∆m2: 69bps; ∆m3:
354bps).
4 Conclusion and discussion
This project has shown that the inclusion of inter-organizational network variables
increases the explanatory power of models predicting the CDS spreads, and in gen-
eral the financial health of companies. We applied a simple OLS regression frame-
work and found an increase in R2 of 191bps and 513bps when including concentra-
tion and influence variables, cumulatively. These results have direct applicability to
credit risk framework, and suggests that they can be improved by including inter-
organizational network information.
The analysis performed in this paper has a number of limitations. Chief among
those is the simplicity of the analysis performed. It would surely be improved in
more advanced models. For example, we applied a static framework, but spreads
vary over time and the volatility could be modeled. Additionally, the supply-chain
data used is solely available for public companies. While attempting to mitigate
inclusion probability, this limits the applicability of the analysis. Moreover, we did
not collect sufficient data to analyze network constraint due to the non-incremental
effect of the Herfindahl index over the number of relationships. Finally, although
CDS spreads are market variables, they are impacted by algorithmic trading. In
turn, this might imply that they are converging around an aggregation of the various
trading algorithms used.
A number of avenues of future work exist. We are particularly interested in
appending the inter-organizational network variables to other existing credit risk
frameworks, such as probability of default models. This would enable an under-
standing of whether network variables do increase the explanatory power in advanced
frameworks predicting the default likelihood.
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Appendices
A Variable distributions
Figure 1 showed that the distribution of the dependent variable is highly skewed and
become more Gaussian-like if the variable is transformed with the natural logarithm.
Figure 3 shows the effect of similar transforms for the main independent variables.
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Figure 3: Distributions of main independent variables untransformed and when
transformed with the natural logarithm
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B Variable statistics
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C Full regression table
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Concentration
Suppliers (log) -0.081** (0.027) -0.042 (0.026)
Customers (log) 0.135*** (0.022) 0.114*** (0.022)
Influence
Suppliers (log) -0.251*** (0.033)
Customers (log) -0.077** (0.029)
G
IC
S
se
ct
o
rs
Consumer Discretionary 0.408*** (0.089) 0.494*** (0.087) 0.463*** (0.083)
Consumer Staples -0.052 (0.120) 0.088 (0.118) -0.056 (0.113)
Energy 0.126 (0.116) 0.184 (0.115) 0.193 (0.110)
Health Care -0.152 (0.158) -0.031 (0.155) -0.137 (0.147)
Information Technology -0.826*** (0.114) -0.940*** (0.114) -0.762*** (0.110)
Materials 0.062 (0.106) 0.060 (0.103) 0.018 (0.098)
Telecommunication Srv -0.007 (0.166) 0.076 (0.162) -0.050 (0.154)
Utilities -0.075 (0.131) 0.055 (0.130) 0.006 (0.124)
C
ou
n
tr
y
of
R
is
k
in
d
ic
at
or
s
(r
ef
:
U
S
)
Austria -0.573 (0.584) -0.379 (0.568) -0.558 (0.542)
Belgium -0.675 (0.444) -0.568 (0.432) -0.457 (0.409)
Brazil -0.348 (0.770) -0.386 (0.748) -0.205 (0.709)
Canada -0.116 (0.184) -0.010 (0.180) 0.092 (0.171)
Denmark -0.498 (0.679) -0.452 (0.661) -0.492 (0.625)
Finland 0.190 (0.254) 0.256 (0.247) 0.335 (0.235)
France -0.478*** (0.097) -0.462*** (0.099) -0.569*** (0.099)
Germany -1.313*** (0.097) -1.331*** (0.094) -0.974*** (0.098)
Greece -0.301** (0.115) -0.399*** (0.116) -0.178 (0.114)
Indonesia -0.326 (1.117) -0.409 (1.093) -0.003 (1.036)
Ireland 0.013 (0.793) 0.189 (0.772) -0.004 (0.731)
Italy -0.352* (0.159) -0.593*** (0.160) -0.533*** (0.151)
Japan -1.321*** (0.127) -1.388*** (0.134) -1.130*** (0.131)
Luxembourg -0.277 (0.553) -0.401 (0.538) -0.345 (0.509)
Mexico -0.351 (0.667) -0.423 (0.651) -0.285 (0.617)
Netherlands -0.616** (0.233) -0.568* (0.227) -0.478* (0.215)
Norway 1.595*** (0.348) 1.608*** (0.339) 1.882*** (0.322)
Peru -0.606 (0.731) -0.680 (0.712) -0.576 (0.674)
Portugal 0.228 (0.331) 0.216 (0.322) 0.309 (0.305)
Spain 0.029 (0.253) 0.013 (0.247) -0.097 (0.235)
Sweden -0.527 (0.314) -0.480 (0.306) -0.452 (0.290)
Switzerland -0.339 (0.269) -0.319 (0.261) -0.159 (0.248)
United Kingdom -0.257* (0.117) -0.199 (0.114) -0.186 (0.108)
DP 0.315*** (0.022) 0.363*** (0.024) 0.396*** (0.023)
Market Cap -0.007 (0.019) -0.026 (0.025) -0.020 (0.023)
Constant 7.284*** (0.159) 7.538*** (0.201) 5.599*** (0.303)
Observations 676 676 676
R2 0.680 0.6997 0.7319
Adjusted R2 0.6642 0.6832 0.7163
∆R2 (bps; from M1) N/A 191 513
Table 4: Regression table with all indicator control variables. The reference GICS
sector is industrials. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D Intermediate regression tables
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Table 5: Metrics refer to the list in Section 2.3. Standard deviations in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Standard deviations in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Tables 5 and 6 shows the intermediate models. Model 1 is the control model in
Table 2. Models 2-11 are each of the concentration variables added to the control
model. As they simply tests suppliers or customers, none of these models are in
Table 2. Models 12-14 show the results from suppliers and customers-pairs of the
concentration variables. Model 12 was selected due to the simpler variables and
14
the largest model improvement (i.e., the concentration model; model 2 in Table 2).
Models 15-18 show the result of the concentration model with each of the influence
variables added separately. It is worth noting that observations are dropped in
model 16 and 18 due to missing data. Model 19 and 20 show the results when
suppliers and customers-pairs of the simple average and weighted average variables
were added, respectively. Model 20 drops 227 observations as missing data is present
in the weighted average variables. We selected model 19 to be the full model due to
the inclusion all observation even though the R2 is 1,076bps better in model 20.
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